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I. INTRODUCTION

It is generally held that trusts are incompatible with the
basic assumptions of civil law systems. In order to discuss this
statement one would have to inquire, first, what is meant by the
term "trusts"; second, what assumed common characteristics of
the civil law systems are being envisaged and declared to be
incompatible with trusts; and third, why those characteristics
should be incompatible with trusts.
It is also commonly held that the Hague Convention of 1984
on the law applicable to and the recognition of trusts concerns
only those trusts that are foreign to the jurisdiction in which the

* Professor of Law, University of Rome.
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rules of the Convention are invoked.' In order to discuss this
statement, one would have to inquire when a trust is sufficiently
"foreign" to warrant the protection of the Convention.
This article asserts that trusts are not incompatible with the
basic assumptions of civil law systems. Moreover, the Hague
Convention does not require an element of foreignness other
than the simple fact that a trust is governed by a foreign law.
These two submissions are obviously interrelated and, once they
are accepted, the conclusion follows that the Hague Convention
allows ratifying civil law countries to have the same access to
trusts that is peculiar to their common law counterparts. In
other words, this article contends that trusts can be formed in
Italy and in Holland just as they would in England or in
Tennessee, provided they are governed not by Italian or Dutch
law, but by English or Tennessee law.
I. THE ALLEGED INCOMPATIBILITY OF TRUST
WITH CIVIL LAW STRUCTURES

A. What is Meant by 'Trust"?

It is now fashionable to refer to the "Anglo-American" trust.
This terminology is most confusing, for it puts in the same
basket the laws of each states of the United States, England,
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the laws of offshore
jurisdictions, and many others.
Some of those laws have a purely statutory origin, and a
recent one at that.2 While some jurisdictions have a separate
equity jurisdiction, others have stated that they possess an
inherent equity jurisdiction. Moreover, the trust structures
prevailing in some of those countries have an overwhelming taxplanning purpose.
Looking at the rules, those relating to the constructive trust
provide a good example of the remarkable differences between
the long-standing English view and the remedial view prevailing
in the United States, that is now making significant inroads in
Canada, Australia, and possibly England. The rules of the

offshore jurisdictions relating to the liability of trustees and to
exclusion clauses are different from the English ones. The same
is true with regard to the rules relating to the relationship
between settlor and trustee or the rights of the beneficiaries.
One might say, as many do, that this is a purely academic
view and, more specifically, a view that shows how comparative

1.
See generallyConvention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition, July 1, 1985, reprinted in MAuRIzIo LuPoI, INTRODUZIONE AL TRUSTS
app. 1 (1994), and 2 INTERNATIONAL TRUST LAWS app. 51 (John Glasson ed. 1999).
2.
For example, Montana did not pass its Trust Code until 1989. See
generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-33-101 to 72-34-517 (1997). See infra note 4.
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law scholars can confuse the issues and create insurmountable
difficulties where none exist. These critics would say that there
is a "common core" at the basis of the Anglo-American trust.
That could hardly be denied, but, as will be shown, when one
tries to define what belongs to the common core, the conclusion
is reached that such a common core is not unique to the
common law systems. Indeed, as this article explains, there is
new and specific evidence that the trust belongs to the civil law,
whence it was imported in England during the formative period
3
of the Chancellor's jurisdiction over trusts.

Finally, if classifications must be used, then it is most
favorable to distinguish among trusts as follows: the Englishmodel trust; the international-model trust;4 and the civil law
model trust.
B. Why Refer to 'Civil Law" Generally?
The so-called dialogue between civil law and common law
was the basic feature of post-World War II comparative law. It
was such a novel attitude that each of the two participants to the
dialogue stressed the unifying elements within its own group and
the differences with the other group. Civil law scholars and
common law scholars emerged as two monoliths. Indeed, as
Rend David's 1964 book on the great legal systems stated, all
civil law countries belonged to one family and all common law
countries to another.5 After a while, and to the present day, new
classifications have been proposed. Most of the proponents came
from the civil law, including the many first-rate academic law
scholars who left Europe during the late 1930s and came to
teach in the United States. They all tended to break the civil law
family with which they were more familiar into smaller families.
Such classifications should be greeted with skepticism. The
different attitudes taken by the civil law systems toward trusts
are evidence of fundamental dissimilarities among them. If
trusts contradicted basic assumptions of the civil law systems,

as the prevailing view asserts, the civil law systems all ought to
react in the same way, that is, by rejecting trusts. As will be
shown, this is not the case.
The term "civil law" still may be used to designate those legal
systems that are commonly thought of as belonging to the civil
law. The self-referencing nature of this approach is obvious and
its usefulness will lie in helping to prove that "civil law" has no
standing as a legal category.

3.
See infra Part II.E. (discussing the early development of confidentia in
civil law countries).
4.
This is a quite recent development, which originated with the Jersey
statute of 1984.
5.
See generally RENt DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (John E. C. Brierley trans., Stevens & Sons 3d
ed., 1985) (1966).
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C. Looking for Civil Law Trusts
There are basically two ways to approach the civil law in the
matter of trusts. One is to refer to the vague notion of the
"common core." The other is to define the trust in comparative
law terms and investigate whether it is to be found in civil law
countries.
I would submit that an appropriate definition of the trust in
comparative law terms would include the following elements:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)

(5)

the transfer of property to the trustee, or a
unilateral declaration of trust;
the lack of commingling between said property
and other elements of the trustee's estate
(segregation);
the loss of any power of the settlor over said
property;
the existence of beneficiaries or a purpose, and
the resulting functionalism of the exercise of the
right transferred to the trustee; and
the imposition of a fiduciary component upon
the exercise of the trustee's rights, with
6
principal reference to conflicts of interest.

One should evaluate whether further elements should be
introduced. Clearly, the more elements that are added to the five
elements listed above, the less comparative value the proposed

structure would have.

The middle path chosen above seems

sufficiently discriminating.
The only other attempt to identify the essential
characteristics of the trust from a comparative viewpoint is that
made by Professor Donovan Waters in a course held at The
Hague in 1995.7 The construction proceeds along lines that are
substantially similar to the characteristics presented above, with
three important distinctions that serve to clarify this article's
comparative approach.
Professor Waters stresses that the trustee "must have full
title to the property under administration as opposed to some
lesser right such as possession, detention or factual control."8
However, this view is erroneous, for the trustee may well be
trustee of a "lesser right" such as possession, detention and even
factual control.
One should keep in mind that any legal
entitlement may be the subject matter of a trust. The point is

6.
See generally MAURIZiO LuPoi, TRUSTS, ch. IV (1997) (an English
translation of this book will be published by Cambridge University Press in the
Spring of 2000).
7.
Donovan W. M. Waters, The Institution of the Trust in Civil and Common
Law, 252 RECUEIL, DES COURS 113 (1995).
8.
See generally id. at 221-25 (discussing the trustee's "control" of the
property).
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that such entitlement must be completely transferred to the
trustee: the entitlement is fully transferred; but the entitlement
need not be full.
Professor Waters identifies an essential characteristic of the
trust in the existence of a tracing action in favor of the
beneficiaries. 9 He also observes that no civil law system permits
beneficiaries under a management situation to have this kind of
protection, except in cases where they are defined as owners. 10
On both accounts, Waters is unfortunately mistaken. The first
factor, the tracing action, is problematic because it comes from a
"proprietary" view of the position of the beneficiaries with which
this author disagrees. As far as the second factor is concerned,
the availability of remedies in civil law systems, it is untrue that
civil law systems do not possess methods of protection
comparable to those provided by tracing. It should be noted in
passing that Italian law has no problem in giving significance to

notice, and in situations comparable to those that allow tracing,
it uses the far wider and more penetrating notion of good faith.
Furthermore, Professor Waters highlights the independence
of the trustee with regard to the settlor and the beneficiaries."
Beneficiaries, however, are an option in trusts. To concentrate
the concept of trust on the beneficiaries is improvident in the
comparative context for two reasons. First, it points the civil
lawyer in the direction of structures that in principle should be
kept separate from trusts, from the contract in favor of third
parties
to
foundations
to
fideicommissa. Second,
it
underestimates the relevance of the enormous expansion of
trusts for purposes, charitable or otherwise. These trusts are
important not only because they have become extremely frequent
in the international trust model, but also because it is thanks to
these trusts that English law is turning its attention to a
reconsideration of the very notion of beneficiary.
D. Civil Law Trusts of Today
It is well known that Liechtenstein enacted a trust law in
1926.12 Some provisions of the law call for close scrutiny:
Treuhidnder (Trustee oder Salmann) im Sinne dieses Gesetzes ist
diejenige Einzelperson, Finna oder Verbandsperson, welcher ein
anderer (der Treugeber) bewegliches oder unbewegliches Verm6gen
oder ein Recht (als Treugut), welcher Art auch immer, mit der
Verpflichtung zuwendet, dieses als Treugut im eigenen Namen als

selbstdndiger Rechtstrdger zu Gunsten eines oder mehrer Dritter
(Beganstigter)mit Wirkung gegen jedermann zu verwalten oder zu
13

verwenden.

9.

See id. at 229-30.

10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 341-34.
See id. at 226.
PERSONEN- UND GESELLSCHAFTSREcHT [PRG] art. 897 (Liech.).
Id.
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One cannot fail to note the careful wording of this article.
"Zuwendet" shows the transfer to the trustee, who holds the
property "im eigenen Namen als selbstindiger Rechtstrdger," in
his own name as an owner inhis own right, subject, however, to
his obligations to the beneficiaries.
Further, the trustee's
ownership as well as his obligations are effective towards all the
world: "mit Wirkung gegenjedermann."
If Liechtenstein has one of the oldest enactments, barring of
course Chile and Colombia with their old fideicomisos, Argentina
has the newest:
Habrd fedeicomiso cuando una persona (fiduciante) transmita la
propiedadfiduciariade bienes determinados a otra (fiduciario), quien
se obliga a ejercerla en beneficio de quien se designe en al contrato
(beneficiario),y a transmitirloal cumplimiento de un plazo o condicin
alfiduciante,al benefiiariao alfideicomisario.
Sobra los bienes fideicomitidos se constituye una propiedad
14
fiduciaria

Here, too, the comparative terms of trusts, as submitted above,
can be clearly discerned. Notable are the transfer to the trustee
(transmita), the obligation of the trustee, and the reference to

purposes. The last element, however, is not found in the law of
Liechtenstein, which closely followed the English Trustee Act of
1925.15
As to the fiduciary nature of the relationship, the Spanish
word "fiduciario" and the German "Treuhander" call for no
elaboration.
A third example of civil law trust arises from the Italian civil
code, as modified in 1975.16 Here, however, no comparable word
exists to indicate a fiduciary relationship.
Ciascuno o ambedue i coniugi per atto pubblico, o un terzo, anche
per testamento,possono costituire un fondo patrimoniale,destinando
determinatibeni, imnobzi o mobili iscrittiin pubblici registri, o titoli di
17
credito, afarfronte ai bisogni dellafamiglia.
L'esecuzione sui beni delfondo e suifrutti di essi non pu6 aver luogo
per debiti che ilcreditore conosceva essere stati contratti per scopi
estraneiai bisogni dellafamiglia.18

This would appear to be a typical family trust.
The unilateral declaration of trust by the spouses is provided
for, as well as a trust formed by a third party in favor of the
family by means of transferring assets to the spouses as trustees.
This provision is unique to the Italian fondo patrimoniale.
Nevertheless, the word "fiduciary" is nowhere to be found.
Yet, a fiduciary component was included in the five basic
elements that define a trust for comparative law purposes. Of
course, no student of comparative law would terminate his

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Law No.24441, Jan. 5, 1995, arts. 1, 11.
See Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19 (Eng.).
See CODICE CMLE [C.C.] art. 167 (Italy).
Id.
Id. art.170
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research on the doorstep of the law in action. Whether or not the
fiduciary component is plainly stated in the legislative
instrument, what matters is how the obligations of the trustee
are appraised by those who apply the statute to the actual

occurrences of life.
Many other examples of civil law trusts exist. 19 However,
the three versions described above should be sufficient to show
that they are likely to fit properly not only within the original
comparative law definition, but probably within much narrower
definitions.
E. Civil Law Trusts as the Foundationof
the English-Model Trust
While the origin of trusts in England will not be discussed
herein, a few words are necessary to explain the results of
research I am conducting on civil law trusts.
In short, ample evidence exists that the testamentary secret
and semi-secret trusts were well known in Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and that they were called
"confidentia," exactly the same name originally attributed to
Over a dozen judgments of the Roman Rota, the
trusts.2 0
tribunal of the Papal State, several judgments from France and
Piedmont, and, equally importantly, opinions by authors from
France, Spain, Germany, and Italy all agree on a structure of the
confidentia that is identical to the structure of the trust. What
follows below are excerpts from some of the sources.21
(1)

Iulius, Alexij nepos, fuerat condemnatus in poenam vitae &
confiscationis bonorum; Alexius timebat ne reliquendo ilium

haeredem bona vendicarentur a Fisco; ideo cogitavit facere
alium haeredemfiduciarium,qui bona ili servaret, ac tempore
22

(2)

quo tutus erat restitueret.
Ludoicus timebat ne bona sua devenirent ad fiscum propter
inquisitionem & imputationem criminalem, quod duo ex ffliis

For instance, Panama, Japan, Ecuador with its "fideicomiso
19.
mercantil," Israel, Venezuela from 1956, Mexico, Peru with its comisi6n de

confianza in commercial matters, and Louisiana. A complete overview of civilian
trust laws can be found in TRUSTS, supranote 6, at ch. V.
See, e.g., R. H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L.
20.
REV. 1503, 1508 n.31 (quoting In re Testament of Richard Middleton, Rochester
Act Book DRb Pa 3, f. 481 v. (1464) ("feoffavit eos ex confidencia ad usum suum
et non ad usum illorum" ("that he enfeoffed them out of trust to his [own] use and
not to their use")); J. H. Baker, The Use Upon a Use in Equity 1558-1625, 93 L. Q.
REv. 33, 37 (quoting Katherine, Duchess of Suffolk v. Herenden, Brit. Lib. MS.
Lansdowne 1067, f. 27 (14 Eliz. I (1572)) ("tout ceo conveiance fuit sur truste et
confidence a sa use")); Cook v. Fountain, [1672] 3 Swans. 585 ("Uses at common
law were nothing but secret confidences."); Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham, [1535] 1
Dyer 7b ("The use in nothing in law, but is a confidence.").
There would no point in being overpedantic by providing the full
21.
bibliographical reference of each source. I shall use the shortened abbreviations
that were current at the time.
Rota Romana, dec. 557 cor. Cavalerio, 24.1.1614, Romana haereditatis
22.
de Alexijs.
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(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

suis habuerint conversationem cum banditis. Secundum
confedt testamentum ad favorem Didonis uxoris haeredis
23
universalis.
D. Laurentius anno 1649 condidit suum ultimum testamentum,
in quo sibi haeredem universalem instituit D. Antonium eius
fratrem cum illo vinculo fideicommissi, quod declarabit
P.Cherubinus religiosus Sancti Dominici, cum quo testator ipse
24
asseruitcontulisse eius voluntaterr
Maginus Poqo, mercatorcivitatisBarcinonae, haeredem instituit
Paulum Ferrer 'pregant y encarregantly done la mi heretat y
bens al posthumo ... que la dicta senioramuller mia aportaen
son ventre, venint d llum vixa, de la manera y ablaforma que
25
liapparraper lo que de el tinct molta confianga.
Quis neque testamento, neque codicillis rogatur,sed domestica
cautione [si noti la terminologia di D. 30.103], vel chyrographo
obligat se ad praestandum ei, qui capere non potest velut ut
26
haereditasfiliospurio restituaturvel concubinae.
Quidam nobilis patavinus, relicta legitimafilio suo dilapidatori
rerum

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

[VoL 32:967

suarum,

institutis

sibi

duobus

consanguineis,

gravaverat eos, ut natis ex eo filio,
filiis legitimis eiusdem
27
haereditatemrestituerent.
Guido Jordanus scripta haerede Virginia earn gravavit
moriendo restituere haereditatem e, cui ipse oretenus
communicaverit. Virginia declaravit, etiam pro exoneratione
conscientiae, veram testatoris voluntatem fuisse quod
28
erigereturCanonicatus.
Johannahabens ex viro iarn defuncto duosfihios coelibes et ex
duobus autem fiuiis uxoratis praedefunctis quatuor nepotes,
donationemfecit de quibusdam praediis uno ex filiis, sub ea
lege, ut moriens tenereturpraediarelinquerepro medietate uni
ex nepotibus unius filii,
quem ipsa oretenus sibi
29
communicaverit.
Octavius dubitabat ne si Federicum patrem, Aquaspartae
ducem, haeredem institueret, commodum haereditatis
perveniret ad Principem Sancti Angeli, cui Dux Federicus
administrationem concesserat, & alios creditores eiusdem
patris;deinde testamentum licentiapatriscondiditfavoreDuds
30
Alexandri Sfortiae.
Antoine Brun institue Foy d'Allegret, sa femme, son heritiere
universelle, d la charge de rendre son heritage, ou partie, a
celuy de ses deux flls afnez qui luy seroit le plus obdfssant
lorsqu'il auroit atteint l'dge de vingt-six ans, suivant l'avis des
31
sieurs d'Allegret ses freres.
Si patersit dilapidatorbonorum filii,
poterit mater bona mente
exhaeredare fihium, ne pater administret bona jfu, modo
instituat confidentem, qui postquarnfilius sit sui iuris effectus,
32
illi haereditatemrestituatcumfructibus.

23.
Rota Romana, dec. 901 cor. Buratti, 4.2.1626, Spoletana haereditatis
seu Confidentiae.
24.
C. A. De Luca, Conf. haer. inst., cap. 63.
25.
Cancer., var, 1. 1, cap. 1.
26.
Mantica, coniect. ult. vol., 1. 10, tit.
4.
27.
Torre, de pact. fut. succ., 1.Il,cap. VII.
28.
De Luca, Theatrum, 1. X, disc. 182.
29.
De Luca, Theatrum, 1. X, disc. 183, Anconetana successionis.
30.
Rota Romana, dec. 238 cor. Calataiu, 23.2.1674, Romana census.
31.
Parliamento of Parigis, 1675.
32.
C. A. De Luca, Conf. haer. inst., cap. II.
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(13)

Nelli restantimiei beni tutti ne instituisco, e nomino, quanto sia
per una metd solamente, mio Erede universale fiduciario
illlustrissimo e eccellentissimo sig. Ugo Fieschi quale dovr
disponere delle detta metd de' miei beni & ereditd in quegli usi,
e in queUe persone in tutto e per tutto come gli ho confidato
33
secretamentein voce.
lohannes Baptista tres fi/os masculos adhuc adolescentulos
habebat et nesciebat qualis quisque indolis esset extiturus.
Per testamentum fratrem suum Christophorum fiduciarium
34
nuncupav t

It is astounding to find in these examples the same purposes
seen in English medieval trusts: benefiting an illegitimate son;
preventing the creditors of the intended beneficiary from

touching the trust fund; requiring the trustee hold property for
beneficiaries who could not be heirs because the state would
take the assets;3 5 allowing the trustee to perform the duties of a
court-appointed tutor; or granting to the trustee a discretionary
power 3 6 to choose among the decedent's sons. In decided cases
and in opinions rendered by jurists, one finds exactly the same
rules that eventually became rules of English law. Furthermore,
one encounters the same words of advice found in present-day
textbooks-for instance, the secret trustee should write himself a
note of the wishes of the secret settlor. Lastly, these cases and
opinions illustrate the fundamental rule that the creditors of the
trustee-even if a secret trustee--cannot attack the assets
bequeathed to him under a will subject to a secret or semi-secret
trust.
Such a wealth of civil law authority, which originates in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries-for example, in an opinion
given by Bartolus-and which closely parallels the English trust,
both functionally and in terms of the applicable rules can only
mean that the English Chancellors, whose civil law background
is well known, drew from them without mentioning the sources
they were using.
All that was before the great codifications of the nineteenth
century.
Thus, the question arises, did such codifications
dissipate a tradition extending for many centuries? Although
codes have no bearing on traditions, they may create
misunderstandings as to traditions, especially because they are
often regarded as sweepers of the past. If they really had swept
the traditions away, how can we explain the examples of civil law
trusts that, as demonstrated above, do exist?

33.
Last Will and Testament of 31st January 1740, which was the subject
of litigation before the Senate of Genoa in 1777 (Fieschi Doria ev. Conservatorio
Fieschi).
34.
Rota Romana, dec. 648, cor. Olivato, 22.1.1768, Romana successionis.
35.
For instance, persons who had been outlawed would not be allowed to
be heirs.
36.
Discretionary trusts were not uncommon in the sources.
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Basic Reasons Why Trusts are Compatible
with Civil Law Structures

It should be clear by now that language in this article
regarding civil law trusts refers not to the so-called "trust-like
devices" or, as the Hague Conference that prepared the
Convention of 1984 put it, "analogous devices,"3 7 but to
institutions that are properly homologous to trusts in
comparative law terms.
The mere fact that trusts exist in civil law countries should
prove the point that there is no basic incompatibility with civil
Why, then, is the opposite view held so
law structures.
unanimously? The simple answer is that common law scholars
have not attempted a comparative study of the civil law
institutions, while civil law scholars have not attempted a
comparative study of trusts. Each of the two groups has taken
at face value what the other propounds. Such an approach is
doomed, and, indeed, has led to mutual misunderstandings.
What follows is a brief enumeration of the basic weakness of
each approach.
Common law scholars have forgotten that trusts would have
been classified as contracts had the common law courts
developed a contractual form of action one century before
assumpsit and indebitatus assumpsit took root. The French
proposed legislation on fiducie begins by stating, "Lafiducie est
un contrat," a statement that is in no way heretical. 3 8 Only a
chronological twist prevented trusts from being contracts.
Having overlooked this point, common law scholars underratethe agreement component of trusts. On the other hand, if a
recent doctrinal attempt to sway trusts into the contractual
area3 9 were to be followed, an additional conceptual weakness
would arise. One cannot eliminate centuries of legal development
simply because an inconvenience has resulted.
Common law scholars embarked on a discussion on the
position of the beneficiaries at a time when German influence in
England and the United States was at its peak. Common law
scholars put on robes that were not their own and handled tools
with which they were not familiar. They tried to steer a
conceptual course instead of a remedial course. A shipwreck
ensued and the debris is still there to be seen. Civil law
scholars, however, quickly adhered to notions they thought they

could simultaneously understand and dismiss, chief among them
the notion of equitable ownership.

37.
See generally ADAIR DYER & HANS VAN LOON, REPORT ON TRUSTS AND
ANALOGOUS INSTITUTIONS (Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law ed., 1982).
38.
As is well known, the proposed litigation of fiducie was eventually
rejected by the French Parliament.
39.
See John H. Langbein, The ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts,
105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
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The well-known correspondence between Maitland and von
Gierke has been repeated between many common law and civil
law scholars, with an additional note: now each of them believes
he understands the other, while in reality none of them
understands. Common law scholars treat civil law systems as if
they shared fundamental legal notions. They do not, however,
share such concepts, not even in basic areas such as ownership,
testamentary freedom, and rights over the estate of the deceased.
Consider, for instance, that fiduciary arrangements serving as
collateral to loans whereby the lender takes title to the asset that
is the security for the loan are commonly recognized in Germany,
and are none other than the oldest form of the medieval
mortgage, from whence the present day mortgage derives.
Similar agreements are held to be null in the eyes of Italian law,
while in France the assignment of receivables to banks by way of
security is generally held to be an instance of fiducie, and
specifically of fiducie-gestion.4 °
Civil law scholars, meanwhile, treat trusts as if they all must
have beneficiaries or as if their basic function was the
management of assets. Neither assumption is true, but civil law
scholars believe that both are. Thus, new half-breed concepts
such as "economic ownership" emerge.
Civil law scholars tend to use analogies without any
foundation, such as regarding the contract in favor of third
parties or with the fideicommissum
Or, led astray by the
unguarded language of common law scholars-who should think
twice before uttering the magic words "equitable ownership" in
front of civil law practitioners--claim that trusts subvert the
framework of real rights, 4 1 or that the unity of patrimony
becomes fragmented. Not one ounce of truth is found in those
pronouncements, but one must acknowledge that common law
scholars have tried their best to confuse the issues for civil law

scholars.
Most dangerously, civil law scholars tend to speak of "the
trust" in the singular. Why has no common law scholar or
practitioner ever told them that "trusts" in the plural is the only
proper approach? A tell-tale bit of linguistic evidence is in the
very title of the Hague Convention: the French title is
"Convention relative A la loi applicable au trust et A sa
reconnaissance," while the English translation is "Convention on
the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition." 4 2 If one
thinks in the singular, one cannot avoid the simplistic and trivial
approach that is easily discerned in the international arena:

40.

This subject is covered by many of the essays collected in LE TRUST ET

AL FIDUCIE; IMPLICATIONS PRATIQUES (J. Herbots & D. Philippe eds., 1997).

41.
While writing the final version of this paper, the two first instances of
title to land registered in the names of trustees have occurred.
42.
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition, supra note 1, reprinted in MAuRIzIo LuPOI, INTRODUZIONE AL TRUSTS
app. 1 (1994).
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distinctions become blurred and fine points of law are ignored in
the desire to achieve clarity that, in the end, breeds obscure
creatures that are neither trusts nor civil law structures.
Civil law scholars regard the transfer from settlor to trustee
as a gift. Why should that be so? The answer is that common
law scholars have made neither an attempt to transcend an
elementary approach, nor an effort to be wary of words that
could lead to confusion. One such example is the position of the
settlor. Why are civil law scholars not clearly made aware that
under the typical trust structure the settlor is basically without
any remedy against the trustee? They cannot reach this
conclusion by themselves because they are unaccustomed to
looking at unilateral transfers that leave the transferor without a
remedy in case the transferee does not fulfil the terms upon
which the transfer was made. The problem is exacerbated when,
as in most commercial trusts, the transfer is the consequence or
performance of an obligation undertaken by the settlor, not an
act of his free will.
One could go on. For example, shifting from the Englishmodel trust to the international-model trust, compare the trusts
for purposes of the international model with their English
charitable counterpart. One would probably find that words play
tricks that academic law scholars should perhaps try to
uncover-after all, do we really know what a beneficiary is? If
not, how can we assert with any measure of confidence that
trusts for purposes are without beneficiaries?
Civil law scholars cannot be satisfied with purely remedial
approaches or weak conceptual structures.
Common law
scholars, on the other hand, must learn the complexities of the
civil law systems-here, too, the plural must be used, as in
"trusts'nand understand that civil law scholars need a
sophisticated conceptual framework to be at ease. For instance,
will anyone discuss properly the difference between a nominee
and a bare trustee when the settlor and the beneficiary are the
same person? And will anyone consider the differences between
each of those instances and agency?
The basic reason why trusts are perfectly compatible with
civil law structures-and here one must be careful to touch only
on general themes that might find proper correspondence in
most civil law systems-is that trusts are not centered on
beneficiaries, but on trustees; that is, not on management, but on
ownership. All civil law systems have long known instances in
which assets owned by someone are not available to his creditors
because they are to be handed over to someone else. One such
example is the secret and semi-secret testamentary trust of the
European ius commune, but many other cases could be quoted.
For instance, under the Italian civil code, assets held by an
undisclosed agent for his principal cannot be seized by the
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agent's creditors. 43 Yet the agent purchased them in his own
name, and for all intents and purposes he is their sole owner.4
The unity of the patrimony-which has scared many a common
law scholar in discussions with civil law counterparts-is a
recent development in the civil law, dating from the French civil
code, and was never meant to cover all that one comes to own.
Some things are owned in order to be handed over, whether
acquired by the temporary owner for the purpose of managing
them or for the purpose of keeping them secure or for whatever
other reason. "Temporary ownership" is a known civil law
category and now Argentinean law openly speaks of propiedad
fiduciara, or fiduciary ownership. 45 The testamentary trust of
the ius commune is clear proof of fiduciary ownership. As the
Liechtenstein law put it, this type of ownership is enforceable
against all the world. 46 It is a real right, not a matter of
obligation. Looking at current law, the comisi6n de confianza, a
long-standing institution of commercial law, is still another
instance. Other examples also might be given.
Common and civil law scholars alike ought to take a fresh,
comparative look at trusts. Hopefully, these comments will yield
at least this result. 47
G. The "HagueConvention" Trusts
The Hague Convention of 1984 did its best, with
considerable success, to further confuse the issues. Article 2 of
the Convention reads as follows: "For the purposes of this
Convention, the term 'trust' refers to the legal relationships
created-inter vivos or on death-by a person, the settlor, when
assets have been placed under the control of a trustee for the
48
benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose."
The phrase "placed under the control has uncertain
boundaries. It does not necessarily imply a transfer of titie;
certainly, it is not the divestiture, the transfer of gewere or seisin.
This is not a purely academic comment. The Convention never
addresses the matter of the creditors of the settlor, while it is
fastidious on the matter of the creditors of the trustee. 4 9 This is
not a casual omission, for the structure of Article 2 allows a trust
to exist even if the settlor is still regarded as the owner of what a

43.

C.c. art. 1707 (Italy).

44.

Id.

45.
46.

See Law No. 24441, Jan. 5, 1995, arts. 1, 11, 13.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

47.
Additional submissions to this effect may be found in MAuRIZIo Lupo,
Trusts and Civilian Categories: Problems Spurred by Italian Domestic Trusts, in
ITINERA FIDUcIAE, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin (R. H. Helmholz & R. Zimmermann
eds., 1998).
48.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition,
supra note 1, art. 2, reprinted in MAURiZIo LupoI, INTRODUZIONE AL TRUSTS app. 1
(1994).
49.
See id. art.11.
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common lawyer would call "trust assets."5 0 Thus, a new trust
concept was born at The Hague-the "Convention trust" or
"shapeless trust."5 ' Convention trusts may be commonly found
in civil law countries, just as in common law countries. Most
management arrangements that do not allow the creditors of the
manager to seize the funds he manages are Convention trusts.
However, no common law jurisdiction would regard such an
arrangement as a trust.
Looking more closely, one finds a clear instance of the
comparative deficiencies that were attributed earlier to the
current lack of understanding between common law and civil law
scholars. 52 The French text of the Convention tends to "entify"
the trust.53 Thus, a subsequent part of Article 2 explains that
"les biens du trust constituent une masse distincte et ne font pas
partie du patrimoine du trustee." In English, however, the text
reads, "the trust assets constitute a separate fund and are not a
part of the trustee's own estate." This is not at all the same
thing: the French text refers to a separate estate, while the

English text refers to the phenomenon of segregation within the
trustee's estate. The French text excludes the assets in trust
from the trustee's estate, while the English text includes them
but clarifies that they do not belong to the "trustee's own estate."
Here, the controlling word is "own." In Italy, it is currently
accepted that the trust assets are owned by the trustee, yet form
a separate fund. Thus, Italy has discarded the Quebec-like
approach in favor of an English-like approach.

I1.

THE ALLEGED REQUIREMENT THAT TRUSTS MUST BE FOREIGN TO
BENEFIT FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION

A. Choice of Law
The Hague Convention system imposes no limitation on the
choice of the law applicable to a trust. In principle, therefore,
there is nothing to prevent an Italian or Dutch citizen from
creating a trust that is governed by the law of his choice. In
particular, there is nothing to prevent all the elements of the
trust from being concentrated in Italy or in Holland, and yet have
54
the trust governed by, for example, English law.

So.
See id. art. 2.
51.
The Shapeless Trust, 1 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 15 (1995).
52.
See supranotes 37-47 and accompanying text.
53.
Just as under the new Quebec civil code.
54.
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition, supra note 1, art. 6, reprinted in MAURIzIo LupoI, INTRODUZIONE AL
TRUSTS app. 1 (1994).
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The main criterion for which the Convention provides is the
settlor's choice of law.5 5 Indeed, the many restrictions that some
delegations at The Hague attempted to impose on this choice
were rejected. Those writers who today would tie the choice of
applicable law to objective elements of nexus suggest positions
that can no longer be supported, since they were already
proposed and expressly rejected at The Hague.
It may happen, expressly or by implication as permitted by
Article 6, that the choice of the settlor falls on a legal system that
does not define the negotium he has created as a trust-as a
Convention trust, of course. Even in this case, the choice of the
settlor does not lead to the non-application of the Convention,
because Article 7 provides that in such a case one looks to the
system that offers the closest connection,5 6 as in the case in
which the settlor has made no choice, explicit or implicit. If this
method does not reveal a law apt to govern the trust, the
Convention is not applicable.
Since this interpretative path is confusing, the following
simple chart describes the logical steps required.
Yes
FTEapplicable

55.
56.

See id.
See id. art. 7.

Has the settlor chosen the
law (expressly
or implicitly)?
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B. The Required ForeignElement
To take the position that the Convention concerns foreign
trusts is either self-evident or a dangerous error. It is selfevident in that one cannot speak of recognition in the presence of
a legal relationship, the effects and structure of which belong to
the national legal system in which recognition is sought.
Recognition presupposes the insertion into a legal system of a
legal event that would otherwise only operate in a different, and
therefore foreign, legal system. It is a dangerous error, on the
other hand, if the term "foreign" is given a different meaning and
is tied, for example, to the nationality or personal law of the
settlor, the place where the trust is administered, the location of
the assets, or to other criteria of this kind.5 7 In the system of the
Convention, such a foreign trust simply does not exist. Signatory
states are obliged to recognize trusts governed by a foreign law,
and it is here that the only required element of foreignness is
found.5 8
The civil law delegates at The Hague based their final
defense on the rules relating to recognition, for they had not
succeeded in placing limits on the freedom of the settlor to
Given the general
choose the governing law of the trust.
provision on the duty to recognize trusts created on the basis of a
law identified pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention,
there arose a flurry of proposals aimed at preventing recognition
in certain cases.
The first objective of five of the civilian delegations was to
forbid recognition of trusts whose assets should be located in a
state that did not recognize the institution of the trust, and in
cases in which settlor and beneficiaries were resident in states
that did not recognize it. The Conference, however, would not
consider any proposition supporting outright denial of
A second approach suggested an option not to
recognition.
recognize. There was no shortage of proposed solutions. For
instance, the Netherlands wanted to reserve to each state the
right to declare whether it would recognize trusts when the
applicable law was different from the one with which all the other
Italy proposed that
elements of the trust were connected.
recognition would become optional when the state of recognition
did not recognize the type of trust in question and did not have a
similar institution, the settlor and the beneficiaries were

57.
I have examined the debates and the many proposals put forward at
The Hague in Lupol, supra note 6, at ch. VI.
I would add parenthetically that the terminology "recognition of a
58.
trust" is legally unsound. States do not recognize trusts. Rather, they either
decide to apply or not to apply a foreign law-the one by which the trust is
governed-in their forum.
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nationals of and
resident in that state, and the trust assets were
59
located there.
In the end, the optional recognition proposal was adopted.
Under Article 13 of the Convention, recognition of a trust may be
denied when all the significant elements of the trust-apart from
the elements the settlor may choose at his pleasure (that is, the
applicable law, the place of administration, and the residence of
the trustee) are more closely connected with a state whose legal
system does not recognize
the institution of the trust or the type
60
of trust in question.
The trust to which the Convention refers is not like any
known trusts or models of trust. As explained above, the
Convention has its own notion of trust, which is set out in Article
2.61 Trusts within that definition are to be found everywhere,
possibly in every legal system. Therefore, states that do not have
the institution of the Convention trust probably do not exist.
Recognition-or rather, application of the foreign law by
which a trust is governed-may be refused.
Under the
Convention, however, recognition is the rule.62

The question

remains, however, when should a state decline to follow the
Convention?
IV. TRUSTS INITALY
A. The Trust Intemo (DomesticTrust)in Principle
Upon Italy's ratification of the Hague Convention, I
suggested that the Convention enabled citizens of ratifying civil
law countries to form trusts that, other than for the governing
law, were completely connected with a civil law country. I
63
labeled such trusts as trusts interni, or domestic trusts.
Moreover, this author suggested that any provision of a trust
instrument in violation of Italian basic rules-for instance, one
protecting reserved heirs-would be unenforceable only to the
extent required to eliminate the violation, with the trust
remaining valid.
This position drew heavy academic opposition and was not
understood by most foreign scholars.6 4 However, it found some
approval in the professions, especially the banking industry. As
59.
I have explored this subject in my essay Effects of the Hague
Convention in a Civil Law Country, in THE REFORM OF PROPERTY LAW (P. Jackson &
D. C. Wilde eds., 1997).
60.
See generally LUPOi, supranote 6, at ch. IV.
61.
See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
62.
See Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their
Recognition, supra note 1, art. 11, reprinted in MAURIZIO LuPoI, INTRODUZIONE AL

TRUSTS app.1 (1994).
63.
See supranote 1.
64.
See, e.g., Waters, supranote 7.
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a result, an entity under the name of "Consulta nazionale sui
trusts" (Consultative Group on Trusts) was formed, in which the
public bodies in charge of the legal, notarial, and accounting and
tax advising professions agreed to participate. The Italian
Bankers Association and the Association of Fiduciary Companies
also became members, as well as three university law
departments-Milan (Bocconi University), Genoa, and Perugia.
Under the auspices of the Consulta, a "school of trust" held
one-day sessions in thirteen Italian cities in 1997.65 Debates
66
flourished and many articles were published in legal journals.
In the last four years, Italy has been the civil law country with
67
the highest number of legal essays on trusts.
Moreover, recently the first judgment handed down after the
ratification of the Hague Convention has confirmed both of the
68
above propositions concerning the trust intemo.
Almost at the same time, Italy's lower Chamber of
Parliament passed a law---currently awaiting approval by the
Senate-to cope with the conflict of interests of members of the
government and other high-ranking officials whenever their net
worth exceeds a certain level. 6 9 The rule was thus accepted that
they either sell their assets or put them in trust. The trust to
which Parliament referred is not an Italian trust, but a foreign
one; that is to say, a trust governed by a foreign law.
Two more bills are currently before the Italian Parliamentone on the management of trusts generally, the other on trusts
for handicapped children. 70 Both refer to trusts governed by
foreign law. Finally, a study group of the Ministry of Finance has
issued a preliminary study on the taxation of trusts in Italy and
71
has taken for granted that trusts intemi are admissible.
So far, attempts to create an Italian law on trusts have been
thwarted. The time simply is not ripe for such a law. Italians are
content to have foreign laws govern their trusts. Parliament in
its wisdom has taken this stand and one can only hope that it
endures.
The acceptance of the trust interni had to meet the challenge
of foreign banks and trust companies, as well as foreign
professional associations. Such groups are unwilling to change
their ways and believe they can make a trust colony of Italy.
They shall be welcome only if they understand that Italy is taking
the lead in the civil law world in the matter of trusts and that

65,
66.
67.
published.
68.
69.
70.

The author was in charge of organizing this event.
Over 75 articles have been published in the last four years.
And a new journal, TRUSTS E ATTMWA FIDUCIARIE, is about to be
Trib., Casani v. Mattei, Foro it. I 1998, I, 2007, 3391.
Senate bill No. 3236 (Italy).
Camera dei Deputati (House of Representatives), bills No. 5194 and

5494 (Italy).
71.

Advisory Ruling, May 11, 1998, No. 37, fisco, 1998, 11148.
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Italy will accept none of their deeds, techniques, structures, and
so on without the closest scrutiny. Italy is forging its own tools.
B. The Trust Intemo in Practice
It is not generally known that trusts are being formed in
Italy, by means of Italian deeds, usually before an Italian notary
and often with Italian trustees. Foreign trust companies are
seldom involved. The trust assets are located in Italy and funds
are kept in Italian banks. Incidentally, Italian banks are going to
great lengths to alter their practice and accommodate trust
accounts-a practice hitherto unknown in Italy. As a result, it is
much simpler for a trustee to open a bank account in Italy than
in, for example, Switzerland. 7 2
Standard trust forms thus are at the same time
inappropriate and damaging in a civil law setting. It requires
little examination to realize that they are based on legal
assumptions that are simply untrue or, worse, illegal in a
different legal culture. They had to be written anew. Read in
Italian, they have a strange flavor for a common law practitioner.

The trust interno instruments are couched in terms that are
understood by a civil law practitioner and yet are in accord with
the governing law of the trust, for instance English or Jersey law.
Thus, they embody the civil law rendering of foreign rules.
Moreover, the trusts intemi include provisions that would be
unnecessary under the governing law of the trust, as well as
others that cope with the legal rules affecting the operation of the
trust and are peculiar to the civil law country with which all the
components of the trust are connected.
Many of the techniques prevailing abroad are of little use in
Italy-and probably, in many civil law countries-and at times
they are so inadequate, and yet forcefully proposed, that major
disadvantages ensue. One example is found in a booklet issued
in Italian by a leading London law firm.
The booklet describes the case of the owner of a palazzo in
Venice who wishes to settle his palazzo for his children. The
London firm advises that the owner contribute the palazzo to a
company and to settle the shares of the company into a trust of
which the settlor will be the beneficiary for life. While life estates
are no longer allowed at common law, Italian law certainly
permits them. 73 A trust is not necessary to grant a life estate
over Italian land. Actually, all that is required is that the settlor
retain the life estate when transferring the land. He will thus
enjoy the palazzo in his own right and the trustee will hold what
at common law used to be the remainder. This arrangement is
much more sensible-and a more tax-effective one-and shows

Italian law does not have an institution similar to the German
72.
Anderkonto.
It is the Roman institution of the ususfructus.
73.
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how trusts in Italy are not following the traditional lines
sponsored by foreign consultants and, incidentally, why foreign
consultants often are of little use.
The fresh look at trust advocated above has become a
current engagement of many law scholars in Italy. Some of their
results are summarized below.
First, a clear line has been drawn between the trust
instrument and the transfer of assets to trustees. The trust
instrument is regarded as a program laid down by the settlor, a
mere statement of intention, or a binding obligation. Indeed,
there are instances in which the settlor forms a trust to
discharge an obligation. In order to keep in line with standard
English practice, an initial transfer is made at the same time as
the execution of the trust instrument, but the bulk of the trust
fund is transferred to the trustees at a later date. There are also
tax reasons that favor this technique.
Second, most if not all trusts interni are made before a
notary, 7 4 because Italian law gives great weight to the certainty of
the date of an instrument and the paramount method to achieve
that certainty is to have a notary witness the execution of the
instrument. This emphasis, however, raises serious problems
because Italian notaries, as generally were Latin notaries, take
responsibility for the validity of any act passed in front of them.
Therefore, they must be satisfied that the instrument is valid
under the foreign law by which it is governed. At times, the
opinion of a foreign lawyer is obtained, although since the
instruments are in Italian, it is not easy to find foreign law
scholars able to give their opinion.
Third, Italy's requirements as to form and to the certainty of
the date transcend the trust instrument.
They affect, for
instance, the appointment of new trustees. Hence, Italian
practice developed a set of rules that are inserted in the trust
instruments in order to assure anyone dealing with a trustee
that he is actually the trustee of that trust. For instance, the
"Register of Trust Events," a book kept by the trustee of a trust
and handed over to his successor, was devised. In it, the trustee
records any fact and inserts copies of any document that is
relevant to the trust. Of course, a memorandum by a trustee is a
well-known common law technique, but then one encounters the
difficulty of discerning what constitutes a trust document. Here
the answer is clear: the book itself is a trust document.
Fourth, although trusts can obviously be made revocable,
Italian practice is against revocability. Old biases die hard and
the aura of law-avoidance that unhappily still surrounds trusts
in civil law countries would find new strength in revocable trusts.
Fifth is the liability of the trustee. At times, Italian trust
instruments make clear that negligence and conflicts of interest

74.
At times, when confidentiality reasons prevail, before a foreign notary,
requiring the international Apostille.
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are to be assessed under the rules of Italian law. Specific
guidelines as to the standard of diligence are often set in trust
instruments. Trustees, as mentioned above, are mainly Italian
professionals. In some instances, fiduciary companies have
agreed to serve as trustees. Oddly enough, no Italian bank has
yet developed any trust business.
Sixth is the position of the protector. Italy frowns upon
sham trusts and, as it were, near-trusts. In spite of what many
international consultants advise, Italian settlors fully understand
that all the advantages a trust can bring about stem from the
fact that it is a real trust. Therefore, protectors are neither used
to curtailing unduly the powers of trustees nor to bringing the
settlor back into the management of the trust assets under a new
name.
Seventh, Italian practice strongly stands against the
retention of any rights or powers by the settlor, notwithstanding
that it fits within the Hague Convention and, of course, the
applicable law. The reason is the same as for the irrevocability of
Italian trusts: we must steer clear of muddy waters. In Italy,
settlors say a final farewell to whatever they transfer to trustees.
Nevertheless, Italian practice has developed clauses under which
the trustees of family trusts must give due consideration to any
financial need of the settlor and act in this respect as they see fit.
Eighth is the protection of the trust assets. Contrary to
English practice, Italian trustees are actually required to register
their title to land as trustees and to appear in shareholders'
registers as trustees. 75 The same is true for bank accounts.
Under Italian rules on notice, it is of paramount importance that
the existence of the trust be made known in every possible way.
Ninth is the nature of the transfer to trustees. Italian law
draws a distinction between gratuitous transfers and liberal
transfers. A gratuitous transfer might not be liberal in nature,
while conditions may be attached to a liberal transfer that would
amount to a consideration in the eyes of the common law and
thus enter the realm of contracts. These concepts are allimportant in succession matters. The reserved heirs can only
claim against liberal transfers, which are not necessarily what
the common law would call "gifts." Here again, a comparative
approach is hardly unnecessary.
Tenth, it is not unknown for a trust instrument to split
jurisdiction. While the courts of the state whose law governs the
trust are given general jurisdiction, Italian courts are at times
selected for the removal of a trustee or giving direction to
trustees.
Finally, the many trusts intemi formed in the last three years
span from commercial to financial to family matters and have

75.
That is made possible by article 12 of the Hague Convention, supra
note 1, reprintedin MAURIZO LupoI, INTRODUZIONE AL TRUsS app. 1 (1994).
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often settled assets of no great magnitude.
This is most
important, for trusts are meant to become a tool in everyday life.

V. CONCLUSION

The Italian outlook does not share the international
consultants' view that trusts are intended to manage wealth or
provide a more favorable tax setting. None of the trusts intemi
has had tax planning as its foremost consideration; few of them
have been formed to manage wealth.
Many trusts intemi are formed for so simple a structure as
an escrow account. In Italy, as in some other civil law countries,
one cannot segregate fungible goods, especially money.
A
foreigner who thinks he has set up an escrow account in Italy
with his lawyer or with a bank has in fact done no such thing. It
takes a trust to create an escrow account. And what about
deposits and part payments? They, too, become an asset of the
person to whom they are given-unless, that is, a trust intemo
has been created.
Trusts will allow Italian legal scholars to devise
arrangements that, far from being prohibited, are simply ignored
by Italian domestic law in spite of a clear need for them in
commercial as in family matters. Arrangements of this sort call
for a thorough knowledge of the foreign law that will govern them
and of one's own law that will govern their operation and most of
their effects. The future of trusts in civil law countries will be
assured if, far from aping foreign techniques, civil law scholars
rise to this challenge.

